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ABSTRACT
Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly
through the study of simplemodels involving interacting senders and receivers of signals.
Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are
all that are needed to capture themeaning or content that is being communicated in these
systems.However, theway theorists routinely talk about themodels implicitly drawsona
conception of content that is richer than bare informational content, especially in con-
texts where false content is important. This article shows that this concept can be made
precise by defining a notion of functional content that captures the degree to which
different states of the world are involved in stabilizing senders’ and receivers’ use of a
signal at equilibrium. A series of case studies is used to contrast functional content with
informational content, and to illustrate the explanatory role and limitations of this def-
inition of functional content.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen dramatic advances in our understanding of commu-
nication and its evolution, through new models developed in biology, phil-
osophy, linguistics, and economics. The models in these areas take different
forms, but many can be seen as having a common theme. They show how sign-
using interactions between senders and receivers are stabilized by means of
selection processes that bear on sender and receiver behaviours.1
Communication is usually thought to involve the production of signs or
representations that have meaning, or content of some kind. Writers working
in, or influenced by, the mathematical theory of information have sometimes
wanted to set these issues aside, as irrelevant or positively unhelpful. Freeman
Dyson claims that information theory’s central dogma is that ‘meaning is
irrelevant’ (Dyson [2011]; see also Shannon [1948], p. 379). Another recent
discussion concurs:
When information theorists think about coding, they are not thinking
about semantic properties. All of the semantic properties are stuffed into
the codebook, the interface between source structure and channel
structure, which to information theorists is as interesting as a phonebook
is to sociologists. (Bergstrom and Rosvall [2011], p. 171)
In an important treatment of this topic, Skyrms ([2010]) argues that although
questions of meaning and content are worth considering, a straightforward
extension of basic ideas in information theory suffices to handle them. Signals
have informational content when they change the probabilities of states of the
world, or of a receiver’s actions. Informational content exists whenever prob-
abilities are changed in this way, regardless of what role the messages play; the
informational content of a signal is represented by a vector that records, for
each possible world state, how much the signal changes the probability of that
state compared to its antecedent probability. This, for Skyrms, is all we need
to recognize when thinking about content.
We agree that one way of understanding the content of signals in sender–
receiver systems is by applying information-theoretic ideas in this way. But, we
argue, there is also another approach to the interpretation of signals in systems
of this kind, one tied to the way that actions guided by a signal have conse-
quences that can stabilize signing behaviours.
Note first that whether signals have informational content, in Skyrms’s
sense, does not depend on whether they are part of a system with signs
being used successfully to coordinate action with the state of the world.
They would still carry informational content even if they were part of a
1 (Lewis [1969]; Spence [1973]; Crawford and Sobel [1982]; Robson [1990]; Farrell and Rabin
[1996]; Bergstrom and Lachmann [1998]; Maynard Smith and Harper [2003]; Huttegger et al.
[2010]; Skyrms [2010]; Clark [2011]; Stegmann [2013]; Zollman et al. [2013]).
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system in which the use of signals was not achieving anything useful at all, the
system was far from equilibrium, and signals were giving rise to behaviours
poorly matched with the world. Existing discussions in the modelling litera-
ture sometimes acknowledge, explicitly or tacitly, the appeal of a notion of
content that is tied to the maintenance of equilibria in some way.
One response to this situation is to look for a view of content that combines
informational and ‘functional’ considerations of this kind. This may well be
fruitful, but our approach in this article is different. We will treat ‘informa-
tional content’ and ‘functional content’ as two separate and useful concepts,
with distinct explanatory roles. Informational content involves probabilistic
associations between signs and the world; functional content involves rela-
tions between signs and the world that figure in the stabilization of a system of
sign use. The aim of the article is to analyse content in a way that is not guided
by common-sense intuitions but by consideration of which notions of content
are useful when thinking about signalling systems and their evolution.
The next section outlines the modelling framework used in the article.
Subsequent sections describe the two kinds of content and then proceed through
a series of cases that illustrate the two kinds of content and their complementary
roles. The article aims to motivate a distinction between informational and
functional content, but does not purport to be the last word on how functional
content should best be formalized. In the discussion of some cases, we acknow-
ledge some problems for our proposed formalization and provisionally sketch
some ways it could be amended to overcome those limitations.
2 Modelling Framework
Our discussion is concerned with signalling systems that have the structure of
a Lewis signalling game. David Lewis ([1969]) gave a model of signalling in
which we assume two agents, a sender and a receiver, where the sender has
access to information about the state of the world, but cannot act on it except
to send signals of some kind. The receiver can see only the signals, but can act
in a way that generates payoffs for both sides. The payoffs resulting from a
receiver’s pairing of an act with a state of the world might be the same for
sender and receiver or they might differ.
Lewis assumed that sender and receiver policies were rationally chosen in a
situation of common knowledge. Brian Skyrms ([1996], [2010]) gave an evo-
lutionary recasting of Lewis’s model. Rational choice was replaced by natural
selection, or in some cases by simple forms of learning. Evolution, learning,
and choice are all processes in which the consequences of behaviours can ‘feed
back’ and re-shape the rules governing behaviour at later time-steps. The
sender modifies (or maintains) its sender’s rule, which maps states of the
world to signals; the receiver modifies (or maintains) its receiver’s rule,
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which maps signals to acts. When a combination of a sender’s and a receiver’s
rule is such that neither side can change their rule unilaterally and be better
off, given what the other is doing, the system is in a Nash equilibrium. When a
combination of rules is such that any unilateral change makes the changer
worse off, the system is in a strict Nash equilibrium.
The Lewis–Skyrms model is related to models discussed in economics
(Crawford and Sobel [1982]; Farrell and Rabin [1996]) and in evolutionary
biology (Maynard Smith and Harper [1995], [2003]; Bergstrom and Lachmann
[1998]; Zollman et al. [2013]). Models in economics have explored issues like
honesty in advertising and the use of signals to help maintain cooperation
(Spence [1973]; Robson [1990]). Honesty in signalling has also been a focus of
biological and evolutionary models, investigating especially the way that a
cost associated with a signal can enforce honesty. Both evolutionary and eco-
nomic modelling have explored the consequences of divergence of interests
between senders and receivers for the possibility and nature of signalling. Our
discussion will be focused on the set-up described by Lewis and Skyrms, but
many of our conclusions can be extended more broadly.
Formally, we are concerned with situations where there is an exogenously
determined state of the world, {S1, S2, . . .}, a sender who can detect this state
and has a range of signals or messages available, {M1, M2, . . .}, and a receiver
who can see the signals and may use them when choosing among available
actions, {A1, A2, . . .}. States of the world are associated with objective prob-
abilities, P(Si). Combinations of acts and states are associated with payoffs for
each agent, represented by matrices (introduced below in Section 4). A sender’s
rule is a mapping from states to messages; a receiver’s rule is a mapping from
messages to acts. Both these rules may be ‘pure’ or ‘mixed’; a sender may, for
example, respond to S1 by always producingM1 (a pure strategy), or perhaps by
producing M1 with probability p and M2 with probability 1 p (a mixed strat-
egy). Our analysis of cases in this article will be simple. In general, we will note
combinations of senders’ and receivers’ rules that are equilibrium states, states
where neither side has any incentive to change their behaviour. In some cases,
drawing on the work of others, we will give a richer description, which notes
how a case behaves under some rule of evolutionary change. Much of our
discussion is intended to be neutral, though, about the details of the selection
process shaping the sender’s and receiver’s behaviours.
3 Two Kinds of Content
3.1 Informational content
An appealing way to think about the content of signals in sender–receiver
systems is to draw on concepts from information theory (Shannon [1948];
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Dretske [1981]). Signals carry information about states of the world when they
change the probabilities of those states (Skyrms [2010]). The term ‘change’
here should not be understood as involving strange causal relations between
signal and state, but merely the fact that the probability of a state conditional
upon the signal is different from the unconditional probability of that state.
A signal has content when it tells us something about how the world is, where
‘tells’ is a matter of changing probabilities, providing evidence. Dretske
([1981]) developed a view of this kind, but for a signal to have content, he
required that it raise the probability of some state of the world to one. A signal
says that the world is in S2, for example, if the probability of the world being in
S2, given the signal, is one, and its probability independent of the signal is less
than one. Skyrms ([2010]) outlines a more general view of the informational
content of signals. A signal has informational content if it changes the prob-
abilities of at least some states of the world, and its content is given by all the
changes it makes to the probabilities of those states. So if a signal raises the
probability of S2, but does not bring it to one, it can still tell us something
about S2. For Skyrms, the kind of content where some states’ probabilities are
reduced to zero is a special case (which he labels ‘propositional content’).
Skyrms adopts a particular format for representing the changes made by a
signal to the probabilities of a set of states. For a set of states, {Si}, the content
of a signal, Mj, is constituted by the changes made to the probability of each
state by the signal, where each ‘change’ is measured as the binary logarithm of
the ratio of the conditional to the unconditional probability of that state. That
is, the content of Mj is:
< log2ðPðS1jMjÞ=PðS1ÞÞ; log2ðPðS2jMjÞ=PðS2ÞÞ; . . . log2ðPðSijMjÞ=PðSiÞÞ; . . .>:
So the content of a message is a vector. In the special case where a message
reduces the probabilities of some states to zero, Skyrms labels those states
in the vector with minus infinity. For example, if a message eliminates all
but one of four initially equiprobable states, the content will be of the form
<1, 2, 1, 1>. Then the content can be given in a familiar propos-
itional form by disjoining the remaining states. Here the content of the signal
is S2; in another case, it might be S2-or-S3, and so on.
We follow Skyrms in thinking of content in general as given by a vector,
with contents that definitively rule out some states being a special case, but we
will do this with a simpler method than Skyrms’s. For us, the informational
content of message M is the vector of post-signal probabilities of the states,
P(SijM). So in the case given above, where a message eliminates all but one of
four initially equiprobable states, the content will be of the form<0, 1, 0, 0>.
Both Skyrms’s and our method have advantages and disadvantages (Godfrey-
Smith [2012]). A disadvantage with using post-signal probabilities to represent
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content is the fact that the content vector is well defined even if the message
has not changed any probabilities, so P(Si)¼P(SijM) for all i. Our response is
to stipulate that in cases where all the states have their probabilities unchanged
by a signal, the signal has no informational content. Our use of the posterior
probability vector is motivated in part by the way it makes possible some
formal comparisons between informational and functional content.
So the informational content of a signal is the distribution of probabilities
of states of the world, conditional on that signal, with the proviso that at least
some of these probabilities differ from the unconditional probabilities of the
states. The informational properties of signals depend solely, then, on the
unconditional probabilities of the states, together with the sender’s rule. In
cases where a message rules out some states of the world, a narrative summary
of the content can be given (in the form ‘S1’, or ‘S1–or–S2’). When no states of
the world are ruled out, a narrative summary would be vacuous. As Skyrms
notes, a signal can carry information about both the states of the world
perceived by the sender and about acts produced by the receiver. Here we
will only discuss informational content about the state of the world.
3.2 Functional content
Signals have informational content (in both Skyrms’s and our sense) whether
a sender–receiver system is at equilibrium or not, and whether the signals are
doing anything useful for the users or not. If a sender and receiver have rules
configured so that the sender maps states to signals one-to-one, and the re-
ceiver maps signals to acts one-to-one, but in a way that guarantees that the
act produced is the worst one possible in each state, signals have the same
informational content they would have if the sender was performing the same
mapping of states to signals, but the receiver was producing the best act in
each state. Informational content is insensitive to facts about how well things
are going and whether the system is at any kind of equilibrium.
This is not in any sense a problem for the notion of informational content.
However, many writers have formed the view that content, of at least some
variety, is dependent on those further factors. This might be seen as recogni-
tion of a richer concept of ‘meaning’ than mere informational content. For
example, Simon Huttegger takes linguistic meaning (‘the linguistic component
of the truth of a statement’) to be fixed by the conventions of meaning
(Huttegger [2007a], p. 2), which are strict Nash equilibria of signalling
games (p. 9).2 Similarly, William Harms identifies ‘primitive content’ with
2 Huttegger’s ([2007b]) work on the distinction between indicative and imperative content also
suggests that there is a role for functional considerations in defining content; see also (Zollman
[2011]). These discussions may lead in the direction of an alternative notion of functional con-
tent to the one presented in the present article.
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pairs of dispositions of senders to produce signals and receivers to act on
signals, when such pairs have been stabilized by evolution or learning
(Harms [2004]).3
These thoughts suggest that there is an additional way of thinking about con-
tent in signalling systems, having to do with the stabilization of the setup and the
beneficial consequences of sender–receiver coordination. In the biological litera-
ture on animal signalling, the concept of ‘functional reference’ has been applied to
such situations (Macedonia and Evans [1993]; Scarantino [2013]; cf. Wheeler and
Fischer [2012]). In philosophy, both information-theoretic relationships and re-
lationships involving success and stabilization of representation-using systems
have been employed as the basis for general theories of content. They are usually
seen as rivals: informational theories analyse content in terms of correlations
between representations and states (Dretske [1981]; Fodor [1990]); teleosemantic
theories hold that the content of a representation derives from the way a ‘con-
sumer’ system acts on the representation to produce adaptive behaviour that has
been relevant to the stabilization of that representation-using system (Millikan
[1984], [1989]; Papineau [1984], [1993]). For example, when a vervet monkey sees
a snake and makes a particular sound, ‘consumer’ monkeys run for cover in the
trees. This has been useful in cases where the sound was produced in the presence
of snakes, so ‘Snake!’ is the content of the sound, even if those cases are
rare and many sounds are false alarms. Some philosophical theories of content
rely on both functional and informational properties in combination (Neander
[forthcoming]; Price [2001]; Shea [2007]).4
Those earlier debates about informational and teleofunctional theories were
not generally carried out in the context of a sender–receiver model of the kind
we are concerned with here.5 Rather than aiming for a choice between infor-
mational and functional properties, or a ‘gluing together’ of them, here we
look at the idea that there are two kinds of content that messages can have in a
sender–receiver system. One kind is derived from informational properties of
the message—the way messages correlate with states of the world—and the
other arises from the role the message plays in stabilization of the system
through some process of selection.
Accordingly, we define functional content as follows: The messages in a
sender–receiver system have functional content only if the system is at an
3 Indeed, Skyrms ([2010], p. 47) himself sometimes privileges the kind of information flow found
at equilibrium—where the receiver ‘acts just as she would have if she had observed the state
directly’ over other cases where just as much information is transmitted.
4 In the literature on ‘functional reference’ in animal communication, mentioned above,
Scarantino ([2013], p. 1016) does the same in combining a ‘contextual perception criterion’
(dependent on evolutionary functions) with a ‘contextual information criterion’.
5 Harms ([2004]) was perhaps the first to connect sender–receiver models with a functional notion
of content.
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equilibrium maintained by some selection process.6 If it is, then for each signal
M, we ask whether there is a behaviour (or distribution over behaviours) of
the receiver specific to M, in the sense that the receiver responds differently to
M than it does to some other available signal. (Note that this allows that the
receiver may respond the same way to some other signal M’, but rules out that
the receiver should respond the same way to all signals in the system.) If so, we
look at whether there is a specific state of the world that obtains on some
occasions when the message is sent, where the relation between that state of
the world and the behaviours produced by the message contributes to the
stabilization of those sender and receiver behaviours. If so, that state is the
content of M. If the receiver’s behaviour in response to M is stabilized by
the obtaining of more than one world state on different occasions, the signal
will have a disjunctive content involving all those world states.
In the case of informational content, we followed Skyrms in saying that
content in general is given by a vector. We apply the same principle to func-
tional content. The informational content vector takes the form of a list of
entries that sum to one—the posterior probabilities of states of the world. The
functional content vector we use here is also a list of entries that sum to one,
though these entries are not probabilities. Whereas the informational content
vector for a signal gives, for each state, how probable it is in the light of the
signal, the functional content vector gives, for each state, the degree of in-
volvement of that state in the stabilization of the sender’s and receiver’s be-
haviours regarding that signal. In the simplest cases, as with the vervet’s
‘Snake!’ alarm call, there is just one state of the world whose obtaining figures
in the stabilization of the system. But suppose that this particular alarm call
has been mostly useful when there have been snakes around, and has afforded
some protection when there are wild dogs around instead. Then the call has
some functional involvement with both states.
More precisely, we define the functional content vector for a message in
relation to baseline payoffs for the sender and receiver obtained in the absence
of signalling. (The following recipe is expressed more formally in the appen-
dix.) The baseline for each agent is the agent’s average payoff in a situation
where the receiver adopts the best strategy available to it without conditioning
its behaviour on any signals (cf. Scott-Phillips et al. [2012], p. 1944). Non-zero
entries in the vector for the functional content of a message correspond to
states in which the message is sent and both agents receive above-baseline
payoffs, given the receiver’s rule for that message. For each such state, we
calculate the difference between the sender payoffs received in that state and
its baseline; we calculate the corresponding difference for the receiver. When
6 Birch ([2014]) uses a different way of defining content to argue that signals in out-of-equilibrium
states have propositional content (which, as with our functional content, in general differs from
informational content).
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necessary, we take the smaller difference to yield a single value for each state.
(See below for discussion of when this minimum must be considered and what
role it plays.) These values are weighted by the posterior probabilities of the
states, given the signal, and normalized to sum to one.7 The result is a vector
representing the relative importance of each state to the stabilization of the
sender and receiver rules for that message. This can be seen as a measure of the
degree of involvement of the message with each state, given how the message is
produced and used to guide action. (Some complications arise when sender
and receiver payoffs differ, but do not differ so much that only one payoff is
above baseline—we discuss these below.)
In that first presentation, we assumed that the receiver performs a single
action in response to M. A receiver might ‘mix’ its behavioural responses to
M, however, producing (say) act A1 half the time and A2 the rest of the time. In
those cases, each action is analysed separately in the way outlined above, and
the results are averaged, weighted by the probability that the receiver will
produce the action in response to M.
The two kinds of content have the same form—distributions over states of
the world, one reflecting posterior probabilities and one reflecting functional
involvement. In cases where one or more entries are zero, a narrative summary
of the content is available. This applies to both kinds of content. For example,
a vector of the form<0, 0.6, 0.4> can be summarized as S2-or-S3. Vectors with
no non-zero entries do not have a non-vacuous narrative summary.
Sometimes the informational content and functional content will coincide
and, in some cases, will diverge. Lastly, the truth—the state of the world on an
occasion when a signal is produced—can also be represented in the same form
as the two kinds of content, with a distribution summing (trivially) to one.
If, for example, there are three possible states of the world, S1, S2, and
S3, and on some occasion S2 is the actual state, this can be represented in
a vector:<0, 1, 0>. So the state of the world, the informational content of a
signal, and the functional content of a signal all have the same form.
Before showing how these definitions play out in some cases from the
existing literature, we will comment briefly on two alternative proposals.
Harms ([2010]) illustrates a rather different way of connecting Lewis-style
signalling games with philosophical work on teleosemantic theories of con-
tent. Harms does not use vectors to capture functional content. Our treatment
also differs from Harms’s in making functional content partly a matter of the
relative magnitude of the payoffs received in different states. Harms has a
different focus, driven by concerns about how the world can be divided into
states objectively. As a result, he dispenses with states of the world external to
the sender–receiver system and characterizes his model only by reference to
7 This is equivalent to weighting the posterior probabilities by a function of the payoffs.
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states of the sender’s sensory apparatus and the payoffs that are received in
those states. Functional contents are regions of a state space defined by the
range of available sensory states and payoffs. There is not scope here to ex-
plore the extent to which Harms’s approach is a rival to the one we develop
here and the extent to which they are complementary.
Our functional content vector is broadly in the spirit of Oliver Lean’s
([2014]) ‘informational functions’. However, Lean casts his approach as con-
trasting with teleosemantic accounts of semantic information in biology,
arguing that greater clarity is achieved by analysing function separately
from information, and treating information in the style of Shannon. By con-
trast, we argue that a function-related notion of content is a useful resource for
analysing communication in signalling systems.
We now turn to examples that illustrate the different roles of the two kinds
of content.
4 Cases
4.1 Case 1: The simplest case
The simplest case is where there are two world states, two signals, and two
acts, and the world states are equally probable. Both agents receive a positive
payoff when A1 is produced in S1 and the same when A2 is produced in S2, and
neither receives a payoff otherwise. There are four possible sender strategies
and four possible receiver strategies (leaving aside mixed strategies). Two of
these are combinations of sender and receiver behaviours in which maximum
payoff is achieved by both parties on every trial because signals are used to
perfectly correlate the receiver’s actions with the state of the world. One of
these signalling systems is shown in Figure 1; here the sender invariably sends
M1 in response to S1, the receiver produces A1 in response, and so on. The
other simply swaps M1 with M2 in Figure 1. These are the only strict Nash
equilibria of the game. Recent models have also shown that evolutionary
processes can guide populations of various kinds to these equilibrium states
(Huttegger et al. [2010]; Skyrms [2010]).
S1
S2
M1
M2
A1
A2
P(S1)=P(S2) 
Figure 1. A signalling system in the case where there are two world states, two acts,
and two signals available.
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At the equilibrium shown in Figure 1, signal M1 makes state S1 certain and
completely rules out state S2, so the post-signal probabilities are<1,0>. The
functional content of M1 is determined, as explained above, by examining the
behaviour of the receiver specific to that signal and noting which pairing of
messages to states contributes to the stabilization of the system. In this case,
the functional contents of both messages are the same as their informational
contents; M1 is produced always and only in S1, and M1 gives rise to A1, which
contributes to the stabilization of the system if and only if S1 obtains. So the
contents are as set out in Table 1.
4.2 Case 2: Partial pooling
Even in simple situations like the set-up above, as soon as the probabilities of
the two world states differ, informative signalling may become evolutionarily
unlikely. In a pooling equilibrium, the sender sends the same signal in both
states and so the signal is completely uninformative about the state of the
world. Correspondingly, the receiver ignores the signal and performs the same
action regardless. These equilibria exist even when the probabilities of states
are equal, but they are more evolutionarily relevant when those probabilities
are unequal, because in evolutionary models of situations in which the prob-
abilities are unequal, populations do frequently end up in pooling equilibria.
These are models in which each agent in the population plays the sender role
half the time and the receiver role half the time, receiving payoffs according to
the matching of receiver actions with states, and the population evolves by the
replicator dynamics (Huttegger et al. [2010]; Skyrms [2010]). Pooling is a
common outcome because agents implementing pairs of behaviours that con-
stitute a signalling system incur a cost when they encounter pooling agents,
since they then condition their behaviour on a completely uninformative
signal. Simply performing the behaviour best suited to the most probable
state is sufficiently profitable that it may be hard for signalling to invade.
Suppose we have a case like this, with S1 much more probable than S2, where
the sender sends M1 in every state and the receiver performs A1, regardless
of what they see. Then the signals do not change the probabilities of states of
the world at all, in which case no signal has informational content in our sense.
Table 1. Relations between informational and functional content for Case 1
Informational content Functional content
Messages M1 <1, 0>; S1 <1, 0>; S1
M2 <0, 1>; S2 <0, 1>; S2
Contents are given first in vector form and then in a narrative summary.
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As the receiver performs the same acts in response to all messages, no signal has
functional content either. As described above, a signal only has functional con-
tent when there is a characteristic behaviour resulting from that signal that plays
a role in the stabilization of the system. Here, no signals are associated with
characteristic behaviours in this sense.
Once there are three states, signals, and acts, partial pooling becomes pos-
sible, where the sender pools two world states together under the same signal,
but sends a different signal in the third state.8 In the strategies shown in Figure
2, a case drawn from (Skyrms [2010]), the sender sends M1 in response to both
S1 and S2, and mixes M2 and M3 in response to S3, with probabilities x and
1 x, respectively. The receiver maps both M2 and M3 to act A3, and mixes its
response to M1, producing A1 and A2 with probabilities y and 1 y, respect-
ively.9 Here we assume again that the three states of the world are equally
probable. The assumptions about payoffs are as they were above: both actors
receive a payoff in world state Si if and only if act Ai is produced, with the
magnitude of the payoffs the same in each case. In evolutionary simulations of
the kind described above, some populations of senders and receivers do end up
at equilibria of this kind (Huttegger et al. [2010]; Skyrms [2010]).
In this case, message M1 shifts the probabilities equally towards both S1 and
S2, and M2 and M3 both shift the probabilities towards S3, giving rise to the
informational contents set out in Table 2.
The receiver’s behaviour in response to M1 is to perform a mixture of A1
and A2. What is the functional content of M1? What is the condition whose
obtaining on occasions where M1 is acted on explains the success of this mixed
policy of behaviour? The answer is that this depends on the value of y. In some
situations, both S1 and S2 are involved in generating payoffs that are above
baseline, given the mix of actions performed in response to M1. In those cases,
y 
1 – y
1 – x
x
S1
S2
S3
M1
M2
A1
A2
A3
P(S1)=P(S2)=P(S3) 
M3
Figure 2. A case of partial pooling in a system with three states, signals, and acts.
8 (Barrett [2006]) is the first discussion of pooling equilibria for signalling games such that, for any
number, n, there are n states, n signals, and n acts; see also (Barrett [2007]).
9 In the cases we are considering, x and y are non-zero.
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the condition is disjunctive: the functional content of M1 is S1-or-S2. This is a
rough narrative summary, though. The functional content vector for M1 is
more specific, as it reflects the fact that proportion 3y 1 of the payoffs
received at equilibrium are in world state S1 and 2 3y in S2.
In other situations, when y is close to an extreme value, one or other of S1
and S2 does not play such a role, and the functional content is not disjunctive.
The contents of the three signals are set out in Table 2.
As shown in Table 2, this case features divergence between functional and
informational content, where the degree of divergence depends on y. When
expressed in narrative terms, the functional content is stronger, for high and
low values of y.
4.3 Case 3: Bottleneck
We now consider a different situation in which sender and receiver payoffs are
suboptimal but the system can be at equilibrium. This is a case where there are
not enough messages available to cover all the states—there are three world
states but only two signals available by which to communicate about them. In
the solution in Figure 3, action A2 is never performed, and in S2, the agents
receive the suboptimal reward of four, obtainable by performing A1 in S2. This
combination of behaviours produces the best outcome possible in the situ-
ation (Skyrms [2010], p. 113).
In this and subsequent cases, the details of payoffs are important. We rep-
resent them in a table with entries for the payoff received for each action in
each world state. In Table 3, sender and receiver payoffs do not differ from
one another.
The strategy in Figure 3 is structurally similar to the strategy in the previous
case (Figure 2) in that it pools two world states. This is another case in which
the functional content of M1 differs from its informational content. Though
Table 2. Relations between informational and functional content for Case 2
Informational content Functional content
Messages M1 <0.5, 0.5, 0>; S1-or-S2 if y  2/3,
<1, 0, 0>; S1
if 2/3 > y >
1/3,
<3y 1, 2 3y, 0>; S1-or-S2
if y  1/3,
<0, 1, 0>; S2
M2 <0, 0, 1>; S3 <0, 0, 1>; S3
M3 <0, 0, 1>; S3 <0, 0, 1>; S3
Contents are given first in vector form and then in a narrative summary.
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the behaviour produced in response to M1 does yield some payoff in S2, this
payoff does not exceed the baseline achievable in the absence of signalling. For
M2, in contrast, the functional and informational contents line up entirely
(Table 4).
4.4 Case 4: Partial common interest
We now consider a game in which the payoffs for sender and receiver differ
such that their interests are not fully aligned. They agree about the best action
in one of the states (S3), but in the other two, they have a different preference
S1
S2
S3
M1
M2
A1
A2
A3
P(S1)=P(S2)=P(S3) 
Figure 3. Sender and receiver behaviours in a ‘bottleneck’ case, with fewer mes-
sages than states.
Table 3. Payoffs for a ‘bottleneck’ case
Acts
A1 A2 A3
S1 7 0 2
States S2 4 6 0
S3 0 5 10
Table 4. Relations between informational and functional content for Case 3
Informational content Functional content
Messages M1 <0.5, 0.5, 0>; S1-or-S2 <1, 0, 0>; S1
M2 <0, 0, 1>; S3 <0, 0, 1>; S3
Contents are given first in vector form and then in a narrative summary.
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order.10 The payoffs are shown in Table 5.11 In Figure 4, a combination of
sender and receiver rules is shown that yields an equilibrium for this system
(Skyrms [2010], p. 80). The sender uses M1 to rule out S3 and raise the prob-
ability of S1 and S2 equally, inducing the receiver to perform the sender’s
preferred action in both states, since that action also pays off reasonably
well for the receiver. The sender has an incentive not to differentiate S1 and
S2 because then the receiver would perform its preferred action for each, to the
detriment of the sender. So here imperfect alignment of interests produces
partial pooling of states by the sender.
One reason researchers have been interested in cases where the interests of
senders and receiver differ is because it raises the possibility of deception.
However deception might be analysed in detail, at least the paradigm cases
involve the sender using signals to achieve payoffs that run counter to the best
interests of the receiver by inducing the receiver to perform actions that are not
Table 5. Payoffs in a case of partial common interest
Acts
A1 A2 A3
S1 2, 10 0, 0 10, 8
States S2 0, 0 2, 10 10, 8
S3 0, 0 10, 10 0, 0
Payoffs in each cell are to sender and receiver, respectively.
S1
S2
S3
M1
M2
A1
A2
A3
P(S1)=P(S2)=P(S3) 
M3
Figure 4. A case of partial common interest.
10 For a discussion of measures of the degree of common interest based on divergence between the
sender’s and receiver’s preference orderings over actions in states, see (Godfrey-Smith and
Martı´nez [2013]).
11 In the previous payoff matrix (Table 3), there was one entry for both sender and receiver payoffs
in a combination of act and state. In Table 5, each cell contains a pair of numbers, for sender and
receiver payoffs, respectively, for the corresponding act and state.
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well aligned, given their interests, with the state of the world. Skyrms argues
that the equilibrium shown in Figure 4 is a case of deception. We do not agree.
What is true in this case is that signal M1 carries less than perfect information
about the actual state, failing to distinguish S1 from S2. The receiver produces
a cover-all behaviour that generates reasonably good payoffs in both S1 and
S2. In no circumstance does the receiver produce an action well suited only to
one state when a different state obtains. The receiver’s payoffs are always
above their baseline. The functional and informational contents of the two
messages used are given in Table 6. The sender is conveying and the receiver is
acting on a true disjunctive content every time M1 is sent (S1-or-S2).
Part of the reason Skyrms holds that this is a case of deception is the fact
that when M1 is sent, there is misinformation; the probability of a non-actual
state of the world is raised by the signal (Skyrms [2010], p. 80). However, that
was also true in the two cases of pooling discussed above (Cases 2 and 3),
where signals, again, did not discriminate all states. We think this case (Case
4), is merely a case of strategic withholding of information by the sender, a
phenomenon quite distinct from deception. We will next consider a case that
we do regard as one of bona fide deception.
4.5 Case 5: Deception
To illustrate the possibility of genuine deception, we consider a signalling game
relevant to animal communication, modifying a game discussed in (Zollman et
al. [2013], Figures 2 and 3, Table 2). Suppose senders are males and receivers are
females, and males signal to advertise their quality. Males can be high or low
quality. Males always prefer to mate, whereas females prefer to mate only with
high-quality males. (These contexts involving display are assumed to not be the
only contexts in which females can mate; uniform refusal to mate by a female in
these contexts does not imply zero fitness.) Suppose too that males have a signal
available that is more costly for low-quality than high-quality individuals to
send. (The payoffs are represented in Table 7.) Then a stable signalling system
can evolve in which males reliably signal their quality and females condition
their mating behaviour on the signal.
Table 6. Relations between informational and functional content for Case 4
Informational content Functional content
Messages M1 <0.5, 0.5, 0>; S1-or-S2 <0.5, 0.5, 0>; S1-or-S2
M2 <0, 0, 1>; S3 <0, 0, 1>; S3
Contents are given first in vector form and then in a narrative summary.
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There is also a ‘hybrid equilibrium’ of this game, which we will focus on
here, in which both senders and receivers sometimes mix their behaviours and
sometimes do not. High-quality male senders always send the more costly
high-quality signal. Low-quality males randomize, sending the high-cost
signal in some cases and the low-cost low-quality signal on other occasions.
On the receiver side, males who send the low-quality signal are always rejected
and those who send the high-quality signal are accepted with some probability
and rejected the rest of the time. Whether a hybrid equilibrium exists depends
on the parameter values—payoffs, costs of signals, and the frequency of high-
quality males—and this equilibrium will involve a specific mix of sender and
receiver behaviours. One example of a set of parameters for which an equi-
librium exists is given in Table 7 and Figure 5. Here, the low-quality males
send the high-cost signal with probability ˜ and high-cost signals are accepted
with probability ½. This combination of sender and receiver strategies is a
Nash equilibrium.12
Table 7. Payoffs in the deception case described in Section 4.5
Acts
A1 (mate) A2 (not mate)
States S1 (high-quality male) 2, 2 1, 1
S2 (low-quality male) 2, 0 1, 1
Payoffs in each cell are to sender (male) and receiver (female), respectively.
Figure 5. A case of deception: a hybrid equilibrium of the case described in Section
4.5. S1 and S2 are the possible states of the male sender. M1 is a costly signal. It
costs ½ for low-quality males (S2) to send M1, but only¼ for high-quality males
(S1). Signal M2 has no cost.
12 The equilibrium requires that the probability of the receiver accepting the high-cost signal (that
is, performing A1 in response to M1) is equal to the cost to low-quality senders of sending the
high-cost signal (that is, of sending M1 in S2). Both are equal to ½ in our illustration. This has
the effect of ensuring that the benefit to low-quality individuals of sometimes achieving a mating
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The informational and functional contents of messages at this hybrid equi-
librium are set out in Table 8. Message M1 has no propositional informational
content, because no state is ruled out by the message. However, it does have a
functional content that is propositional: S1. This is the only state in which the
receiver’s rule at equilibrium generates for both sides an above-baseline
payoff. As a consequence, when M1 is sent in S2, which does happen some
of the time, this message has false propositional content. It says the world is in
S1 when in fact the world is in S2. False propositional content is quite different
from what Skyrms called ‘misinformation’. The case in Figure 5 is the only
case so far in which a signal sometimes has false propositional content, while
misinformation in Skyrms’s sense is found also in cases with bottlenecks and
pooling (Sections 4.2–4.4).
We understand deception to occur when a message with a false content is
sent and the receiver is induced to behave in a way that benefits the sender and
harms the receiver. ‘Deception’ in this sense is a success term; it can be dis-
tinguished from attempted deception, which occurs when a message with false
content is sent in a way that has the potential to benefit the sender at the
expense of the receiver. So, for example, when the sender sends M1 in S2 but
the receiver refuses to mate, this is merely a case of attempted deception. If the
receiver does mate with the low-quality sender, this is a case of deception.
Existing discussions of cases of this kind routinely assume a concept of
deception similar to ours, without spelling out a view of content that licences
it. For example, Zollman et al. ([2013]) describe the hybrid equilibria that can
exist in these signalling games in the following terms: ‘In plain English, this
means that the sender sometimes “lies” and is honest at other times, whereas
the receiver only sometimes chooses the sender’s favoured action’. If the
notion of ‘lying’ requires that a message has false content, and not merely
that it withholds some information, then informational content as discussed
here and elsewhere does not suffice to make sense of lying, and something like
functional content in our sense is needed.
Table 8. Relations between informational and functional content for Case 5
Informational content Functional content
Messages M1 <0.5, 0.5>; no propositional content <1, 0>; S1
M2 <0, 1>; S2 None
Contents are given first in vector form and then where possible in a narrative summary.
is exactly balanced, on average, by the cost to low-quality individuals of sending the high-cost
signal.
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A further notable feature of our treatment of this case is that the functional
content of M2 is undefined, as Table 8 shows. This is because no state of the
world generates higher-than baseline payoffs given the receiver’s equilibrium
response to M2. Indeed, although M2 is treated in the model as a signal, it is
associated neither with costs nor the possibility of benefit, so it is more nat-
urally understood as the absence of a signal—as a ‘null’ signalling behaviour.
While that is a satisfactory result in the present case, in other games with
intrinsic signalling costs, our proposed definition of functional content is more
problematic. Bergstrom and Lachmann ([1997]) analyse another game with
costly signals, the Sir Philip Sidney game. They show that there are separating
equilibria in which both sender and receiver are worse off than they would be
if the receiver produces its best cover-all response to completely uninformative
signals.13 In such a separating equilibrium, there is no state in which both
players obtain payoffs above their baseline, as we have defined the baseline; so
there is no functional content.
To sketch a response to this problem, we return to the theoretical motiv-
ation for our account. Functional content is a matter of more than just coor-
dinating actions with the state of the world. That happens in the case of perfect
anti-signalling mentioned above, where signals are perfectly coordinated with
world states, but no payoffs result. Functional contents arise where the players
coordinate actions with the state of the world successfully. Isolating cases of
successful coordination calls for a standard of comparison, which is what our
baselines achieve. If one accepts this theoretical motivation, then it follows
that functional content is not ubiquitous—it is absent in some equilibria where
signals are coordinated with the state of the world.
As formulated, our definition has the consequence that functional content is
absent when players fall into an equilibrium in a costly signalling game that
makes them worse off in every world state than they would be without signal-
ling (although there is functional content in the costly signalling game we
analyse here). Rather than just accepting that consequence, another solution
would be to define baselines more locally when there are intrinsic signalling
costs, in terms of nearby states in which both sides do worse than at the
equilibrium. We do not attempt to resolve this issue here.
4.6 Case 6: A further problem arising from divergent interests
When sender and receiver interests diverge, but do not diverge greatly, a prob-
lem can arise that has not been addressed in our cases above. This problem
comes when, given some act or mix of acts produced in response to a message
at equilibrium, sender and receiver both achieve above-baseline payoffs in the
13 We are grateful to a referee for pointing out the implications of this game.
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same combination of states, but the degrees to which they benefit in each of
these states differ. Then when a vector representation of functional content is
given, strictly speaking there will be one vector for the sender and one for the
receiver, not a single vector describing both. This does not happen in either of
the two cases with divergent interests discussed above. In one of these cases
(Case 5), no message is interpreted in a way that gives both parties an above-
baseline payoff in more than one state (only the sender receives an above-
baseline payoff in more than one state, given the receiver’s rule for M1). In the
other Case 4, both sender and receiver obtain above-baseline payoffs in S1 and
S2, given the rules associated with M1, and these payoffs do differ between
sender and receiver, but for neither agent is one state preferable to the other.
So there is no qualitative difference between the agents with respect to the
roles of S1 and S2 in stabilizing this aspect of their interaction.
In other possible cases, when the interests of the agents diverge in a way that
leads to a message being associated with more than one state of the world for
each agent, though with different weightings for these states across the two
agents, the formulation we give is designed to capture the ‘overlap’ between
sender and receiver interests (see the appendix for details). As we noted, in
such cases it is also straightforward to record separate functional content
vectors for sender and receiver, respectively. Comparisons between our pre-
ferred functional content vector, which captures the overlap, and the separate
functional content vectors for sender and receiver would show the respects in
which sender and receiver have different interests in the way the signal is
connected to world states at equilibrium.
A case put forward by a referee helpfully illustrates another way this kind of
divergence can arise. In this new case, there are four equiprobable states, five
available acts, and two costless signals, with payoffs as given in Table 9. We
focus on the equilibrium shown in Figure 6, in which both players receive an
above-baseline payoff in one particular state for each signal, but the relevant
state differs for each player. For example, when M1 is sent, the sender receives
a payoff only in S1 and the receiver only in S2. Our ‘overlap’ functional
Table 9. Payoffs in Case 6
Acts
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
States S1 2, 2 5, 0 5, 0 0, 0 0, 0
S2 2, 2 0, 5 0, 5 0, 0 0, 0
S3 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0 5, 0 5, 0
S4 2, 2 0, 0 0, 0 0, 5 0, 5
Payoffs in each cell are to sender and receiver, respectively.
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content vector is undefined. Table 10 records separate functional content vec-
tors for sender and receiver.
Comparing the separate functional content vectors for sender and receiver,
and in the absence of an ‘overlap’ functional content vector, we can see that
the two players have completely different interests in the way the signal is
connected with world states at equilibrium. The receiver is only interested in
the way M1 carries information about state S2, whereas the sender receives a
payoff only when S1 obtains. An alternative perspective on this case would be
to argue that sender and receiver do share an interest when M1 is sent—an
interest in the fact that S1-or-S2 obtains. A natural move here would be to
describe the game in a more coarse-grained way, so that S1-or-S2 counts as a
single state. Sender and receiver would then overlap in functional content with
respect to that state. The difficulty is to formulate a rule for when it is appro-
priate to move to a more coarse-grained functional content vector that does
not have the result that all cases of partial pooling turn into cases of perfect
signalling with more coarse-grained states. While this case is clearly another
reason to distinguish functional contents for sender and receiver in some cases,
we have no settled view as to whether there is also a principled way to define a
non-vacuous overlap functional content vector in this case.
Figure 6. Sender and receiver behaviours in the equilibrium considered in Case 6.
Table 10. Relations between informational and functional content for Case 6
Informational content Functional
content
for sender
Functional
content
for receiver
Messages M1 <0.5, 0.5, 0, 0>; S1-or-S2 <1, 0, 0, 0>; S1 <0, 1, 0, 0>; S2
M2 <0, 0, 0.5, 0.5>; S3-or-S4 <0, 0, 1, 0>; S3 <0, 0, 0, 1>; S4
Contents are given first in vector form and then in a narrative summary.
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5 Discussion
The small selection of examples above show that there is an important role for
a notion of content that goes beyond purely informational content, even in
these simple cases. Specifically, there is a role for a treatment that is connected
to equilibria and how they are stabilized by payoffs. The way theorists rou-
tinely talk about simple signalling systems makes this clear. They say things
that implicitly draw on a richer notion of content than informational content.
This might be seen as metaphorical. But we have shown that a concept like this
can be made precise and shown to be useful, especially in contexts where false
content is important, such as in the analysis of deception.
Teleosemantics also aimed to capture the involvement signs have with the
world. The concept of functional content developed here is a fine-grained take
on that idea. The need to go beyond a purely informational treatment and
introduce a broadly functional notion of content is one of the insights of
Millikan ([1984]), Papineau ([1993]), and Dretske ([1988]). What we’re doing
is combining those ideas with Skyrms’s introduction of a fine-grained vector
representation of content. Our functional content vector captures the relative
importance of different states when more than one state is involved in stabiliz-
ing a pattern of sender and receiver behaviours.
The concept of functional content we have developed here is not the only
way this could be done. And it is clear that our treatment in this article still
faces some problems. We hope to have shown that it is widely applicable
enough to illustrate that there is space for an account of functional content
alongside that of informational content.
Lastly, we make a comment about the status of these properties, which we
have been calling a kind of ‘content’. Clearly the signs themselves and their
associated behaviours are much simpler and more rudimentary than those
associated with human language and thought. They are probably simpler
than most non-human sign systems as well. We don’t claim that informational
and functional content exhaust the rich semantic properties seen in language
and thought. They can be thought of as simpler members of a family of
semantic properties, or as precursors to real semantic properties. These sim-
pler semantic or proto-semantic properties are, however, important features
of signalling systems. Our notion of functional content captures a theoretically
important aspect of sender–receiver interaction.
Appendix
Here we will provide the definition of the functional content vector.
Functional content of signal M ¼ < x1
s
;
x2
s
; . . . ;
xn
s
> :
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We define the functional content vector for an arbitrary signal M, following
the procedure given in Section 3.2 above. The vectors listed in the case studies
above are the result of applying this procedure to each signal M1, M2, . . .
found in the model. Below we proceed in two parts. First we define the base-
line payoff for a signalling game. The baseline is then used as a threshold to
generate components of the functional content vector.
A.1 Baseline Payoffs
We define the functional content vector in relation to the baseline payoffs
obtained for the sender and receiver in the absence of signalling. Baseline
for each (vr, vs) is its expected payoff given A*, the action dictated by the
best strategy the receiver can adopt without conditioning its behaviour on any
signals.14 In defining the baseline here, we consider only pure receiver strate-
gies since in the absence of signals, the receiver can never do better by mixing
than by pursuing some pure strategy.
Receiver’s baseline payoff; vr ¼
Xn
i¼1
P Sið Þvr AjSið Þ;
Sender’s baseline payoff; vs ¼
Xn
i¼1
P Sið Þvs AjSið Þ;
vr A
jSið Þ ¼ Receiver’s payoff for action A when world is in state Si;
vs A
jSið Þ ¼ Sender’s payoff for action A when world is in state Si;
n ¼ number of world states Si:
A.2 Functional Content Vector
Components xi in the functional content vector reflect the average payoff
received from world state Si when signal M is sent, thresholded by reference
to the baseline payoffs calculated above. Non-zero entries correspond to states
in which both agents receive above-baseline payoffs given the receiver’s rule
for M, and record the amount by which the threshold is exceeded. The re-
quirement that both agents receive above-baseline payoffs implies that the
agents have similar payoff matrices to some degree, but differences are still
possible. Accordingly, we construct the vector entries by using the lesser of the
amounts by which the two agents’ payoffs surpass their baseline: dmin Aj jSi
 
.
14 If there is more than one such action, then A* can be any one of the receiver’s best cover-all
strategies, unless there are differences in the average payoff that results for the sender. We don’t
here attempt to resolve the question of how baselines should be defined in the latter case.
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This is designed to represent the overlap between the sender’s and receiver’s
interests:
dmin Aj jSi
  ¼ min ðvr AjjSi  vrÞ; ðvs AjjSi  vsÞÞ:
This formulation is appropriate when there is a single population of agents
that play the sender role half the time and the receiver role half the time. If
there are separate populations of senders and receivers, then the payoffs in the
payoff matrix should be transformed to a common scale. Before calculating
the baselines and dmin, the sender’s payoffs should be linearly transformed so
that its maximum payoff is one, and the same for the receiver. For simplicity
we do not include such transformations in the definition below.
The entries in the functional content vector are then defined as follows:
xi¼
P SijMð Þ
Xm
j¼1
P Aj jM
 
dmin Aj jSi
 ( )
;
if
Xm
j¼1
P AjjM
 
vr AjjSi
 
>vr and
Xm
j¼1
P Aj jM
 
vs AjjSi
 
>vs
0; otherwise
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:
m¼ number of available actions Aj
Finally, the components are normalized by s so that, as with the informa-
tional content vector, they sum to one:
s ¼
Xn
i¼1
xi:
The use of dmin terms is only essential in special cases; see Section 4.6 of the
main text for discussion. In such cases, another option would be to define
separate functional content vectors for sender and receiver when they differ.
We do not hold that one of these approaches is better than the other; each
might represent different features of these cases.
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